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Joëlle Proust
The word “feeling” denotes a reactive, subjective experience with a distinctive em-
bodied phenomenal quality. Several types of feelings are usually distinguished,
such as bodily, agentive, affective, and metacognitive feelings. The hypothesis de-
veloped in this article is that all feelings are represented in a specialized, non-
conceptual  “expressive”  mode,  whose function is  evaluative and action-guiding.
Feelings, it is claimed, are conceptually impenetrable. Against a two-factor theory
of feelings, it is argued, in the cases of affective and metacognitive feelings, that
background beliefs can circumvent feelings in gaining the control of action, but
cannot fully suppress them or their motivational potential.
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1 Introduction
“Feeling” denotes a reactive, subjective experi-
ence  with  a  distinctive  embodied  phenomenal
quality and a formal object, which may or may
not coincide with embodied experience. Feelings
typically express affect and valence in sensation.
“Reactive” means that feelings are closely asso-
ciated with an appraisal of a present property
or  event.  The term “reactive”  is  crucial.  The
term “feeling” is sometimes used to refer to a
non-reactive,  perceptual  experience.  For  ex-
ample,  when one  perceives  an  object  through
touch, it is common to say that “one feels one’s
key in one’s pocket”. But “feeling”, in this con-
text, does not refer to a reactive phenomenon.
It  rather  refers  to  the  feedback  of  one’s  own
key-touching  activity.  This  type  of  perceptual
feeling is expected to result from one’s action
and, hence, does not belong to the domain of
reactive feelings. What is called the “formal ob-
ject” (see Kenny 1963) of a feeling is the prop-
erty in the triggering event that elicits the re-
active feeling. For example, the formal object of
fear  is  some threatening  property  detected  in
the perceptual field. 
Feelings  can  be  pleasant  or  aversive,
strong or  weak,  short-lived  or  long-lasting,  or
have an arousing or depressing character. They
motivate distinctive dispositions to act,  whose
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urgency is entailed both by the feeling experi-
ence and the context in which it is experienced:
feeling an intense pain disposes the person to
promptly  locate and remove the  cause  of  the
pain; except, for example, when it is self-inflic-
ted, or when it is part of a ritual. 
Most theorists of feelings agree that they
are associated with—or, for those who identify
emotions with conscious experiences1 consist of
—specialized, internally generated bodily sensa-
tions, such as an increase in heart rate, contrac-
tions or relaxations of  the facial  muscles,  vis-
ceral impressions, tremors or tears, impulses to
run away, etc. As will be seen below, some feel-
ings,  however,  do  not  express  emotions.,  i.e.,
1 From the viewpoint of the somatic feeling theory of emotions, emo-
tions can be explained as a somatic change caused by the perception,
real or simulated, of a particular object. See  James (1884, p. 190),
and Damasio (1994, 2003). Other theorists of emotion, however, con-
sider that the conscious experience of having an emotion includes
propositional attitudes, and not only feelings. See sections  4 and  5
below. Moods are long-term affective states, and will not concern us
here.
they  are  not  affective.  A  feeling  tends  to  be
more  explicitly  felt  as  bodily  when  it  has  a
body-related function; that is, the phenomeno-
logy makes the need to be served salient (feeling
tired, feeling a pain in the joints) in order to
motivate  action.  In  affective  feelings,  in  con-
trast, the bodily phenomenology tends to recede
to  the  fringe  of  consciousness  (feeling  in  love
with A, feeling angry with B).2 From this obser-
vation, it is easy to infer that types of feelings
differ in their respective meanings: they in some
sense  express what they are about. In affective
feelings,  an  experience  of  “feeling  toward”  is
supposedly present: the emotion is felt as being
about an object, a person, or a situation—the
objects, rather than bodily sensations, are the
focus  of  one’s  emotional  attention.  Affective
feelings  also  include  mixed  cases  where  one
seems to both experience a strong bodily feeling
at the same time as the intentional content that
2 On this concept, see Mangan (1993, 2000) and Reber et al. (2002).
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Glossary
Feeling “Feeling” denotes a reactive, subjective experience with a distinctive embodied 
phenomenal quality and a formal object, which may or may not coincide with the 
embodied experience. Feelings typically express affect and valence in sensation. 
Reactive “Reactive” means that feelings are closely associated with an appraisal of a 
present property or event. 
Formal object “Formal object” of a feeling is the property in the triggering event that elicits the 
reactive feeling.
Metacognitive feelings Metacognitive feeling are experienced while conducting a cognitive task: the agent
may find the task easy or difficult, anticipate her ability or inability to conduct it.
Once the task is completed, the agent may have the feeling of being right, or have
a feeling of uncertainty about the outcome of her endeavour.
Affordance Affordances are positive or negative opportunities, expressed in feelings: an af-
fordance-sensing swiftly and non-reflectively motivates the agent to act in a par-
ticular way.
FS Affordance FS Affordancea [Placea=here], [Timea=Now/soon], [Valencea=+], [Intensitya=.8 
(comparatively specified on a scale 0 to 1)], [motivation to act of degreed accord-
ing to action programa].
Transparency A mental state is transparent if, when it is activated, its intentional content is ac-
cessible to the subject who entertains it.
Incidental and integral feeling Metacognive feelings are called “incidental” when they are not based on valid cues
about the cognitive task at hand, and hence, have no predictive value. They are 
called “integral” when they actually carry information about cognitive outcome.
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this feeling seems to refer to, as when Marcel
Proust’s narrator reports experiencing an acute
pain in the chest when thinking about his be-
loved deceased friend, Madame de Guermantes.3
It is unclear whether metacognitive (also called
noetic,  or  epistemic)  feelings  are  affective  or
non-affective (see section 7 below). They are ex-
perienced while conducting a cognitive task: the
agent may find the task easy or difficult, and
may anticipate her ability or inability to con-
duct it. Once the task is completed, the agent
may have the feeling of being right, or may have
a feeling of uncertainty about the outcome of
her endeavour. Take the case of a person who
feels unable,  presently,  to remember what she
had for dinner last night. Her feeling of not re-
membering is correlated with activity in a facial
muscle,  the  corrugator  supercilii  (Stepper &
Strack 1993). Her feeling, however, is not about
her disposition to contract or relax this or that
muscle, of which she is certainly unaware. It is,
rather, about her present disposition to remem-
ber what she had for dinner. Epistemic feelings
seem  to  be  “feeling-toward”  experiences,  and
have cognitive dispositions or contents as their
object. 
Descriptive phenomenology, however, does
not offer in itself an account of the intentional
structure  of  feelings.  We  need  to  understand
how feelings in general gain their real or sup-
posed aboutness, and how they relate to action-
guidance as a function of context; i.e., we need
to provide a functional analysis of feelings. Sec-
tion  2 will  begin to provide such an analysis,
and will  address  a  preliminary  issue—namely,
Do the phenomena that are usually called “feel-
ings” share a property that makes them a nat-
ural  kind?  In  section  3,  the  specific  informa-
tional structure of feelings will be seen to ac-
count for their generic characteristics. Section 4
will  clarify  the  account  by way of  addressing
various  objections.  Section  5 will  attempt  to
show  that  the  proposed  account  fares  better
with  experimental  evidence  than a  cognitivist
account of affective and metacognitive feelings.
Section 6 will examine whether or not metacog-
nitive feelings have an affective valence.
3 See the analysis of this example in Goldie (2002), p. 56.
2 Are feelings a natural kind?
Paul Griffiths has  claimed  that  emotions do
not constitute a natural kind, in the sense that
they do not form “a category about which we
can  make  inductive  scientific  discoveries”
(2004, pp. 901–911). One can agree with latter
claim,  however,  without  concluding  that  feel-
ings do  not  constitute  a  natural  kind.  First,
feelings  are  not  only  affective  ingredients  in
emotional  awareness.  Some  feelings,  such  as
feeling cold or sick, or feeling that one is act-
ing, have nothing to do with affective episodes.
Second, there are evolutionary reasons to dis-
tinguish, within emotions, two classes of sub-
jective  appraisals.  Emotion  theorists  usually
contrast feelings expressed in primary emotions
—fear, anger, happiness, sadness, surprise, and
disgust—with  various appraisals cum conative
dispositions associated  with  higher  cognitive
emotions,  such  as  envy,  guilt,  pride,  shame,
loyalty, vengefulness, and regret. The first are
phylogenetically  and  ontogenetically  prior  to
cognitions. They belong to the ancient limbic
system, which is present in some form in most
animals. A quick route from the retinal image
to the amygdala through the thalamus allows
affective  information  to  control  behavior  (see
LeDoux 1996).  Primary  feelings  are  thus
triggered  independently  of  concept  possession
and motivate specific responses. Secondary af-
fective  experiences,  in  contrast,  might  have
evolved on the basis of social constraints in re-
lation to cooperative action among humans. In-
deed (with the possible exception of pride and
shame)  they  are  not  present  in  nonhuman
primates.4 They  activate  newer  brain  struc-
tures; they require concept possession, depend
on  background  beliefs,  and  do  not  generate
characteristic behaviors.  Finally, primary feel-
ings  are  clearly  embodied,  while  secondary
emotions seem to have no proprietary somatic
markers.  An  interesting  idea,  suggested  by
Jesse Prinz (2004, p. 95), is that the facial or
somatic correlate of secondary emotions,  when
they have one, involves a blend of the somatic
markers for primary feelings. 
4 On this contrast, see Frank (1988), Griffiths (1997), and Prinz (2004,
pp. 82-83). On whether they qualify as emotions, see Ekman (1992).
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In summary: emotions differ, among other
things, because of the unequal role that feelings
have  in  the  two  classes  of  emotions  just  dis-
cussed. The wider scope of feelings, when un-
derstood  as  “reactive,  subjective  experiences
with a distinctive embodied phenomenal qual-
ity”, seems to be more unified than emotions,
and making feelings seem like plausible candid-
ates for a natural kind. 
We need, however, to turn this tentative
definition into a general functional characteriza-
tion that presumably holds for all feelings (bey-
ond affective ones) and only for them. Here is a
proposal: feelings constitute the sensitive part of
predictive  and  retrospective  processes  of  non-
conceptual evaluation of one’s own and others’
well-being and actions. Being essentially evalu-
ative, feelings are always the output of a com-
parator: in other terms, they are crucial monit-
oring ingredients in self-regulated adaptive con-
trol systems. In such systems, the specific func-
tion of a feeling consists in detecting how much
a current observed value of a parameter deviates
from its expected value, on one or several dimen-
sions relevant to survival (see Carver & Scheier
2001).  Their  formal  object,  when  they  have
one,5 (such as being afraid of the bear in front
of me) cannot be analyzed independently of the
monitoring function they serve within a special-
ized control loop.6 Relevance to well-being, how-
ever, extends to bodily condition, goal achieve-
ment, and availability of preferred goods of all
kinds (food, partner, social status). The relev-
ant dimensions of variation that feelings track
may accordingly be of a sensory, proprioceptive
kind (feeling thirsty, cold, etc.), social-affective
(feeling angry), or agentive (goal-related). Goal
achievement, however, involves either epistemic
or instrumental success, respectively generating
epistemic feelings (feeling interested, bored, epi-
stemically uncertain) and agentive feelings (feel-
ing of happiness, of agentive confidence, of own-
ership of  one’s action, etc.).  Feelings,  in sum-
mary, are the outcomes of comparators in a con-
5 As observed by  Goldie (2009),  some feelings, for example, [feeling
anxious] or [feeling depressed], seem to lack a formal object, which is
typically the case with moods. As indicated above, moods will not be
discussed in this article.
6 Bechara et al. (2000) make it clear that the somatic marker theory
applies to action, whether it engages affects or not.
trol loop; they carry non-conceptual information
about how much one’s present condition devi-
ates from the expected condition. From a func-
tional viewpoint, they form a natural kind inso-
far as their function is to indicate a comparative
outcome through a dedicated embodied experi-
ence.
Note, however, that there are comparators
that trigger no feelings at all: these non-sensit-
ive comparators may either work outside con-
sciousness  (for  example,  error  signals  driving
immediate correction7, not to mention compar-
ators that work at the cell level), or they can
take concepts as their input, rather than react-
ing to percepts or situations (for example com-
parators of currency or of educational value). 
As far as feelings are concerned, they are
directly related to a presently-perceived context
(or an imagined or remembered context, but in
a “present-like”, indexical mode): one can feel
too hot, too cold, or too tired (or feel “OK”,
which usually means a tolerable deviation from
the expected value). One can feel the fright one
has had,  even after  the  frightening event  has
ended.  The  outcome  of  a  feeling-based  ap-
praisal, from a functional viewpoint, has to con-
sist in some disposition to act that is adaptive,
relative to the input to which the feeling is a re-
action. Granting that feelings, as sensitive com-
parators  in  a  control  system,  form a  natural
kind, there should be common properties cut-
ting  across  the  various  types  listed  above.  In
fact we find three types of functional relations
between feelings of a given kind and the associ-
ated disposition to act. First, feelings, according
to their embodied valence, typically determine
actions of approach or of avoidance. Some dic-
tate caution, others boldness.  Some encourage
self-restraint,  others  self-assertion.  Fear  pro-
motes a flight tendency, hunger a tendency to
approach food. Second, they have a specific ori-
entation in time: some feelings have a predictive
function,  and  thus  induce  a  behavior  that  is
based on contingencies to be  further displayed
in the present context. For example, fear, when
directed  at  a  possible  danger,  increases  the
readiness to flee in case the danger concretizes.
7 see Logan & Crump 2010 and Nieuwenhuis et al. 2001
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Others have a retrospective function, and induce
corrections to the commands one has previously
used, or to one’s previous preferences. For ex-
ample, feeling nauseous after food ingestion in-
duces  food  avoidance,  i.e.,  a  change  in  the
agent’s preferences. In contrast, feeling disgust
at the sight of some food may prevent the agent
from approaching it. A subset of feelings, such
as  feeling happy,  have both temporal  orienta-
tions.  Third,  according to their  embodied dy-
namics  and  intensity  (which  is  called  their
“level of arousal”), feelings can provoke an elev-
ation in the energy available to the system: they
provoke  excitement,  agitation,  power  in  the
coming response; or, on the contrary, they may
have a soothing effect and diminish the tend-
ency to act.
One major functional property of feelings,
from  the  viewpoint  of  information  extraction
and use, is that they can very rapidly extract
and synthesize  multiple  cues  from perception.
This rapidity is a consequence of the automatic
and encapsulated character of the control mech-
anism whose output they express. Feelings are
automatically triggered by a specific type of in-
put (which is the definition of informational en-
capsulation).8 Automaticity  is  associated  with
feelings  being  inescapable,  at  least  for  those
feelings  that  have  been  allowed  to  develop
within a culture, granting normal development.9
The mechanism that generates somatic, noetic,
or  affective  feelings  from  inputs  (perceptual,
imaginative, or memorial) does not require one
to have specific beliefs or intentions.10 Informa-
tional  encapsulation  explains  why  transitive
feelings persist  when the agent finds out that
the situation is different from what she thought
to be the case. Just as an optical illusion such
as the Müller-Lyer effect does not immediately
dissipate when it turns out that the segments
are equal, a feeling of anger does not disappear
as soon as the agent realizes that its formal ob-
ject is not exemplified. 
8 Automaticity  in  appraisal  is  central  to  Ekman’s  analysis  of
primary emotions (1992). See also Griffiths (1997), Prinz (2004),
and  Zajonc (1980).  On informational  encapsulation,  see  Fodor
(1983).
9 For example, fearlessness in the presence of danger may result from a
disturbed childhood.
10 Some affective feelings, however, can be intentionally controlled in
the long run, through cultural learning. See Murata et al. (2013).
Automaticity and informational encapsu-
lation seem also to characterize agentive feel-
ings (see Pacherie 2008). Feelings generated in
the  course  of  a  physical  action  come  in  two
varieties: generalized or specialized. Some, such
as feelings of agency, of initiation of action, of
ownership and of motor control, are indicators
monitoring  action  in  progress:  they  concern
“who” is performing the action, and “how” the
action  is  being  conducted  (see  Proust 2000).
Others concern the evaluation of an action in
one’s  own repertoire:  a professional  carpenter
or an experienced musician, for example, have
feelings  telling  them  if  an  action  sequence
(whether their own or another agent’s) in this
repertoire  sounds  or  looks  right,  even  before
they identify why they have this feeling. These
feelings are also the outputs of  a comparison
between  motor  anticipations  and  observed
properties of the action (a “forward model of
action” supposedly stores the expected values
of  crucial  parameters;  Wolpert et  al. 2001).
They can predict the likelihood of completing
an action (when the question arises, in difficult
or  non-routine  cases),  or  evaluate—on-line  or
in retrospect—how swiftly,  effortlessly,  or un-
hesitatingly an action was performed. Agentive
feelings thus have an essential role in regulat-
ing the fundamental properties of physical ac-
tions, such as the quality of the outcome,11 and
the ownership of the action.12 
Noetic  feelings,  finally,  are  functionally
similar to somatic, affective, and agentive feel-
ings—although their evolutionary pattern seems
to  be  different  from  the  other  three  kinds.
While most organisms have proprioceptive, af-
fective, and motor control, and hence, presum-
ably,  somatic,  affective,  and  agentive  feelings,
few are able to control their cognitive decisions
through metacognitive feelings (see Beran et al.
2012 and Proust 2013). The latter are generated
when  trying  to  perceive,  to  remember,  or  to
plan a cognitive task (in particular, when trying
to plan how long to study material in order to
11 Non-conscious error signals can also guide corrective steps, without
the agent noticing them. 
12 Pat Haggard et al. (2002) have demonstrated the crucial role of the
temporal binding between felt initiation of action and output in the
sense of being the agent of an action. See, among other articles, Hag-
gard et al. (2002).
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master  it).13 They  are  also  relied  upon  when
trying to reason or to solve a problem; when
conversing, feelings of effort, and of informative-
ness, are monitored by speakers and hearers in
order to maintain a common level of relevance.
Like  other  feelings,  they  have  two  distinctive
temporal  orientations.  Some have a predictive
function. A feeling of knowing (FOK) may arise
when trying to remember an item—for example
a proper name—that one has not yet retrieved:
having a strong FOK reliably predicts that one
will finally retrieve the searched content (Koriat
& Levy-Sadot 2001). A feeling of having a name
on the tip of one’s tongue (TOT) both signals
the fact that a word is not presently available,
and, according to its onset, valence, and intens-
ity, whether it is worth or not worth pursuing
one’s effort to retrieve it (see  Brown 1991 and
Schwartz et al. 2000). Feelings of fluency are the
sense of ease of processing one may feel or fail
to feel when attempting to perceptually discrim-
inate objects  with a given property, or to re-
trieve items from episodic or semantic memory.
A feeling of familiarity is particularly salient, in
human adults, when no further fact about the
target can be retrieved. It offers useful informa-
tion about the epistemic status of  the target:
that it is not new, but nevertheless not fully re-
cognized. A feeling of familiarity, then, motiv-
ates,  among  others,  an  attempt  to  recognize
what or who a target is. Other metacognitive
feelings have a retrospective function. When a
name is retrieved, a feeling of rightness (FOR)
motivates the agent to consider her response the
expected one.14 Various feelings of uncertainty,
based on fluency, coherence, plausibility, inform-
ativeness,  or relevance, also have retrospective
functions:  their  valence  and  intensity  tell  the
agent whether she should accept or reject a cog-
nitive outcome. These parameters are expressed
through specialized somatic markers, such as in-
creased activity in the facial muscle involved in
smiling,  the  zygomaticus  major—for  positive
valence—or  the  corrugator  supercilli  (involved
in frowning)—for negative valence (Winkielman
& Cacioppo 2001).
13 This prediction involves judgments of learning (JOL). See Koriat &
Ackerman (2010).
14 On FORs, see Thompson et al. (2011).
Taken  together,  these  considerations  are
compatible with the view that somatic, agent-
ive, metacognitive, and “primary” affective feel-
ings, even if they differ in their formal objects,
form a natural kind. Our attempt above at a
functional characterization focused on the gen-
eral relations of feelings to inputs, outputs, and
mediating  evaluative  mechanisms.  From  this
characterization,  it  emerges  that  feelings  are
gradients in comparators that are felt subject-
ively, rather than being propositional states de-
scribable in analytic, objective terms. These ob-
servations,  however,  suggest  that,  in  order  to
express  a specialized and fine-tuned reactivity
to one or several formal objects, and to motiv-
ate  adapted  behaviors,  in  order  to  be  re-
membered and conveyed to others feelings must
have their own representational format. We now
turn  to  the  following  question:  What  is  the
structure of  the information that  is  extracted
and expressed in a feeling?
3 What kind of information do feelings 
express?
The above question is important for clarifying
the relation of feelings both to their formal ob-
ject, when they have one, and to the action that
they motivate. In the case of metacognitive feel-
ings  (M-feelings),  the  difficulty  is  particularly
pregnant:  it  stems  from  the  fact  that,  if  we
grant  that  M-feelings  do  not  require  concept
possession  to  be  felt,  then  it  is  unclear  how
their formal object should be construed: What
are they about? Let us take a feeling of uncer-
tainty, felt while trying to remember a proper
name. Is this feeling about a memory  state, or
about a  disposition to retrieve a proper name?
If a feeling is about a memorial state or a dis-
position, its intentional content needs to include
concepts of memory, of correctness, and of un-
certainty. Empirical evidence, however, demon-
strates that animals with no mindreading abil-
ity, and hence that are deprived of concepts of
perception or of memory, are able to monitor
their perception and memory as reliably as hu-
mans do.15 Furthermore, human children, from
15 Rhesus monkeys have been found to opt out of more or less challen-
ging perceptual or memory trials as a result of trial difficulty. For a
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early on, are sensitive to the contrast between
familiar and unfamiliar faces and environments.
This supports our claim above: one can feel cold
or anxious or uncertain without having the cor-
responding concepts of those feelings. A propos-
itional format does not seem to apply to feelings
in general.16
How do feelings fulfill their particular em-
bodied, subjective way of representing—a mode
we will call the “expressive mode”? The broadly
functional characterization given above provides
useful  clues.  Expressive  representations  com-
prise  exclusively  non-conceptual,  perceptual,
and  evaluative  (gradient-  and  valence-based)
elements, which taken together express a sub-
jective relation to the environment (internal or
external) and a given tendency to act. It should
be emphasized, however, that adult humans can
obviously  entertain  simultaneously expressive
and conceptual representations. The present hy-
pothesis,  in  conformity with  the  literature  on
dual-processing,  is  that  the  expressive  system
processes  information  and  influences  decisions
on the basis of its own narrow range of associ-
ations and norms; while the conceptual system
takes advantage of background beliefs and infer-
ential reasoning to make decisions in light of a
broader set of norms. Let us take the case of an
agent feeling joy after having won the lottery. A
human adult normally has [lottery] in her con-
ceptual repertoire, along with some of the infer-
ences that can be made on its basis. However,
the agent’s reactivity to the winning event falls
under  the  expressive  mode  of  representation,
because this is the mode in which evaluation of
the opportunities is conducted. This feeling rep-
resentation  presumably  enlightens  and  orients
the concept-based reasoning that  can be con-
ducted concerning the same event, such as won-
dering  how  to  spend  the  money,  or  whether
quitting her job is a good idea. We propose to
call “affordance-sensing” the information that a
feeling  expresses.  Affordances  are  positive  or
negative opportunities, expressed in feelings: an
affordance-sensing  swiftly  and  non-reflectively
summary of the results and a methodological discussion of their sig-
nificance,  see  Beran et al. (2012),  Chapter 1,  and  Proust (2013),
Chapter 5.
16 For a defense of emotional representations as nonconceptual and ac-
tion oriented, see Griffiths & Scarantino (2009). 
motivates the agent to act in a particular way.
Departing somewhat from Gibson’s use of this
term within his ecological theory of perception,
“affordance” is used here to refer to a non-con-
ceptual and entirely subjective appraisal of the
environment  by the  agent:  an  affordance  is  a
perceived utility, which can be positive (some-
thing to approach and grasp) or negative (some-
thing to avoid and from which to flee).17 
The corresponding  representation  has  an
indexical structure, because it has an essential
relation  to  an  occurrent  represented  property.
Indexicality, however, has to be understood here
in a non-referential sense. What is indexed is an
occurrent (relational) affordance, rather than an
individual event or object. Here is our proposal
for  what  a  given  feeling  structure  (FS)  looks
like:
• FS Affordancea [Placea=here],
[Timea=now/soon],  [Valencea=+],  [Intensitya=.8
(comparatively specified on a scale 0 to 1)],
[motivation to act of degreed according to ac-
tion programa].
The subscript “a” is meant to indicate that all
the elements that have this subscript are rep-
resentational cues, i.e., ingredients, in present
affordance-sensing  a.  Note  that  the  strength
(or degree) of the motivation to act does not
depend only on the fitness significance, i.e., on
the  valence  and  intensity  of  the  affordance.
Other factors, such as the physical condition
of the agent and her prior arousal level (her
mood)  also  modulate  her  motivational  level
(Schwarz &  Clore 2007). The specification of
the location of  the  affordance may vary,  de-
pending on the way the feeling was generated,
but  indexicality  and  reactivity  suggest  that
the relevant affordance is often sensed to oc-
cur where the feeling is  experienced. As will
be seen later, however,  M-feelings do not in-
volve a specification of place. 
The feeling structure proposed above in-
cludes somatic markers,  even if  they are not
17 See  Proust (2009,  2013).  Prinz (2004) briefly discusses this idea in
connection with the intentional content of emotions (p. 228). See also
Griffiths & Scarantino (2009): in emotion, “the environment is rep-
resented in terms of what it affords to the emoter in the way of skill -
ful engagement with it.”
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made  explicit:  these  markers  are  the  sub-
strates for the information of valence and in-
tensity. This information is carried by neural
activations  and  associated  bodily  changes,
such as a sudden sensation of pleasant muscle
relaxation,  or  of  unpleasant  muscle  contrac-
tion,  or  of  visceral  contractions  associated
with  fear.  Intensity  of  affordance,  i.e.,  the
arousal  produced  by  a  feeling,  is  also  felt
through the comparative amount of bodily re-
activity  to  the  affordance.  These  somatic
markers, as emphasized above, are themselves
part of a monitoring system designed to pre-
dict and assess one’s relations to the environ-
ment  along  the  relevant  dimensions  listed
above (agency,  individual  and social  well-be-
ing, preferences, and metacognition).
Let  us consider  further  how to read the
feeling structure given above. It is meant to re-
flect  not only what is  presently felt,  but also
what is stored in memory when a feeling is ex-
perienced, what can be imagined, and what can
be  conveyed  to  others  in  expressive  behavior.
The central idea is that feelings sensitively ex-
press  a subjective, embodied relation to an op-
portunity in an input from the environment (un-
derstood in a broad sense as including external
and  bodily  properties  relevant  to  well-being).
This primitive intentional relation is best cap-
tured by the term  affordance-sensing.  Feelings
express this affordance as their focus (or formal
object), along with its graded valence—ranging
from  very  unpleasant  to  very  pleasant—and
with its intensity gradient, which ranges from
small to large.18 
As often emphasized, reactivity to an af-
fordance occurs very rapidly in a processing se-
quence—even before the perceptual processing
has been completed—and well before a concept-
based judgment can be made (see  Dolan 2002,
p. 1191;  Griffiths 1997, pp. 77;  LeDoux 1996,
pp. 174;  Prinz 2004, pp. 60, and  Zajonc 1980,
pp.  153).  This  suggests  that  an  alternative,
18 For a review of the theories of valence, see Prinz (2004), Ch. 7. Prinz
takes valence to be a different determinate experience in each feeling.
On valence  as  determined  by  overall  value,  from a  consumer  se-
mantics viewpoint, rather than as an experience of pleasure/displeas-
ure, see  Carruthers (2011), pp. 127–130. This view, however, does
not build on the nonconceptual information being felt, but rather on
its being represented “in an abstract and amodal way”, which, never-
theless, is motivating.
evaluative informational system screens the in-
put with its own independent memorial struc-
tures.19
An affordance does not need to have an
objective  counterpart  to be  sensed,  i.e.,  for  a
feeling to arise: it is enough that the agent anti-
cipates  it  (even  wrongly),  imagines  it,  or  re-
members it, for the corresponding feeling to be
expressed. A feeling, thus, does not presuppose
a  conceptual  appraisal  of  the  context,  but
rather it indexes in an embodied way a direct
evaluative  registration.  Given  that  an  afford-
ance does not aim at characterizing the world,
one cannot say, when the expressed affordance
has  no  objective  counterpart,  that  a  feeling
“misrepresents” the world as having a given af-
fordance, or reciprocally that an existing afford-
ance was “missed” by the agent when the latter
failed to detect it. For misrepresentation to oc-
cur,  a  system must  be  equipped  to  attribute
properties to individual objects, that is, it must
be able to apply concepts. The expressive sys-
tem, however, does not refer to objects as inde-
pendent entities. Hence, affordance is not liter-
ally what a feeling is about, because aboutness
presupposes  that  what  is  represented  is  inde-
pendent from the representational system. Be-
ing relational, affordances cannot be grasped in-
dependently  of  the  experience  of  a  sensitive
agent. When saying that a feeling “expresses”
an affordance, we mean that it “resonates” to it
(or that it monitors it). Resonance is a neural-
somatic reactivity: it carries indexical and eval-
uative information, but it does not refer to the
world or attempt to describe it. 
It is possible, however, to objectively char-
acterize  what  a  feeling  functionally  refers  to,
and to pinpoint cases of misrepresentation, by
re-describing the feeling structure above in non-
subjective,  non-evaluative  propositional  terms.
Taking advantage of her perceptual and back-
ground beliefs, the agent can claim to have mis-
taken a piece of wood for a snake, for example,
19 These expressive representations do not require a system to have
the  capacity  to  form  propositional  representations.  They  are
close to what  Strawson called “a featural  representational  sys-
tem”,  allowing  an  animal  to  navigate  with  no  propositional
thinking (1959). On the comparison between the two representa-
tional modes, see Proust (2013). The question of the penetrabil-
ity of feelings by propositional thought is explored below, in sec-
tion 5.
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and to make explicit that there is no reason to
be afraid of a piece of wood.
Our analysis of FS helps us to clarify why
“feeling one’s keys in one’s pocket” does not be-
long  to  reactive  feelings.  Recognizing  through
touch the object in one’s pocket as being one’s
keys, or merely having a proprioceptive experi-
ence in fact caused by one’s keys, are two ways
of perceiving one’s keys, involving respectively
cognitive  and  sensory  proprioception.  But
neither needs as such to involve an affordance of
a given intensity and valence. In contrast, let us
suppose that the perceiver believes wrongly that
she has forgotten her home keys, which are in
some distant location, and will not be able to
get back home. Feeling her keys in her pocket
immediately  triggers  a  positive  affordance,
opening up the field of possible actions.
4 Questions and objections
The present proposal raises a number of addi-
tional  questions  and  objections.  Let  us  start
with the most radical objection. 
4.1 Are feelings representations?
Granting that feelings, affective or not, can be
pure “physical effects of objects on the nerves”,
in William James’ terms (1890, vol. 2, p. 458),
they do not need to have any genuine represent-
ational value. James invites us to take the case
either of purely somatic feelings or of objectless
emotions when they are generated by a patholo-
gical  condition—such  as  the  precordial  catch
syndrome (PCS) which is a feeling of pain in
the chest that usually goes away without treat-
ment, but can lead the victim to think he or she
is  suffering  a  heart  attack.  In  this  case,  the
emotional  experience  of  dread,  James says,  is
“nothing but the feeling of a bodily state, and it
has  a  purely  bodily  cause”  (1890,  vol.  2,  p.
459). From this, one might conclude that a feel-
ing is a merely peripheral phenomenon: it does
not have a function to represent, nor does it ex-
press anything in particular. What can be said,
in response, is, first, that feelings have a crucial
evaluative function, which they perform thanks
to their expressive structure. In PCS, the pa-
tient’s experience of dread has valence and in-
tensity,  expressed  through  sudden  breathless-
ness, chest constriction, blurred vision, tingling
sensations in the skin, an elevated heart beat,
and a disposition to crouch. These feelings are
not only a matter of sensory “peripheral” exper-
ience: they are also used by the patient to col-
lect  her existing Bayesian correlations,  and to
monitor with their help the present affordance
expressed. A second illustration of the repres-
entational  nature  of  feelings  is  that  they  can
arise in the absence of the sensory basis they
seem to have. For example, illusory feelings of
being touched—a reactive somatosensory feeling
about a change occurring on one’s body surface
—can be created by manipulating the coherence
of the intermodal inputs from vision, touch, and
proprioception. In the so-called “rubber-hand il-
lusion”, participants feel that their hand is be-
ing touched with a paint brush, when in fact it
is an artificial hand, not theirs, that they see
being touched. They also, after a while, “feel as
if  their  (real)  hand is  turning ‘rubbery’”  (see
Botvinick &  Cohen 1998).  This  experiment is
evidence that feelings are informational states,
which monitor inputs, and, in extreme cases like
this, cause the brain to try to reconcile contra-
dictory multimodal input. In the proposed in-
terpretation, however, seeing one’s hand being
touched  is  a  reactive  feeling,  while  actively
touching an object generates a percept—which
plays quite a different role in cognition.
4.2 What does “resonating to an 
affordance” mean?
Second,  speaking  of  “subjective  resonance”  to
an affordance (see the discussion of how a feel-
ing  “resonates”  to  an  affordance  in  section  3
above)  may  look  improperly  metaphorical.20
This is meant, however, to mark the difference
between feeling and perceiving. While percepts
allow recognition and identification of external
objects and properties, feelings express specific
affordances  in  a  perceived,  imagined,  or  re-
membered situation. For example, one can feel
cold  right  now,  or  simulate  being  cold  when
20 In a similar vein, William James writes that, in emotions, “the whole
organism is a sounding board” (1890, vol. 2, p. 450).
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planning a polar trip; one can remember how
angry, or bored one was in a given episode and
context. Feelings give agents prompt access to
the relevant features of a new situation through
sensed changes in their experience. Importantly,
resonance is also an apt term for empathy, i.e.,
for the propagation of feelings from an agent to
an onlooker, based on expressive behavior (De-
cety &  Meyer 2008;  Dezecache et  al. 2013).
Brain imagery suggests that the perception of
pain in another individual largely overlaps with
the  regions  activated  when  experiencing  pain
oneself (Jackson et al. 2005). Such empathy, in
the present proposal, exemplifies how a feeling
structure can be communicated through a set of
congruent  behavioral  cues  associated  with  a
given affordance (here a painful stimulus), with
a  valence  and  intensity  that  are  bodily  con-
veyed.
4.3 Non-conceptual content as a common 
feature of feelings and percepts
Third, one might object that a common feature
of  feelings  and  percepts  is  that  they  include
non-conceptual contents. This is true; but no-
tice  the  difference  between  the  two  types  of
non-conceptual  content:  while  non-conceptual
ingredients in perception are related to object-
ive,  external  contrastive  cues  such  as  shapes,
edges,  colors,  volumes,  and auditory patterns,
which can be static or dynamic, but are always
purely  descriptive,  non-conceptual  contents  in
feelings  only  include  evaluative  states,  which
combine the general type of the affordance, its
valence,  its  intensity,  the  proper  action  pro-
gram,  where  all  constituents  are  “bodily
marked”, i.e., expressed through somatic mark-
ers. Therefore we cannot say that feelings “per-
ceive” affordances, for this would suppose either
that feelings have direct sensory access to the
world—which they don’t, for they extract their
inputs  from sensory  perception—or  that  they
have direct sensory access to the body, which
they don’t have either—feelings are the subject-
ive counterpart of bodily changes. Therefore we
cannot  say that  agents  “perceive  affordances”
when they experience a feeling, for this would
suppose either that feelings have a direct sens-
ory access to the world, which they don’t, for
they extract their inputs from sensory percep-
tion, or that they have direct sensory access to
the body, which they don’t have either. Feelings
are  the  subjective  counterpart  of  bodily
changes. 
Neuroscientific research about the role of
emotion in perception offers evidence in favor of
this view. An affordance is  made immediately
salient by the system’s ability to sensitively re-
act  to  a  (half-)perceived  element  in  a  given
known context.21 We speak of “half-perception”
on the basis of what is known about the timing
of object perception. Affordance predictions are
made only  milliseconds after  visual  sensations
register on the retina, i.e., before the categorisa-
tion of perceived objects is completed (Barrett
& Bar 2009). The orbitofrontal cortex (OFC; in-
volved in emotion and reward in decision mak-
ing, thanks to projections from the thalamus) is
able to extract an affordance in the first 80ms
of the visual process, merely on the basis of low
spatial  frequency and magnocellular visual  in-
put (Lamme & Roelfsema 2000). What happens
to  perceptual  access  when a  perceiver  cannot
extract affordances? Barrett & Bar (2009) have
shown that the lack of emotional reactivity in
early perception impairs  object  categorization.
A patient who accidentally lost his visual ability
when three years  old received in adulthood a
corneal transplant. In spite of his recovered abil-
ity to extract visual information from the world,
this perceiver had trouble categorizing what he
saw. The authors’ suggestion is that reconstitut-
ing  the  internal  affective  context  associated
with  past  exposures  to  an  object  (which  was
lacking in this particular case) is “one compon-
ent of the prediction that helps a person see the
object in the first place” (Barrett & Bar 2009,
p. 1325).
In summary:  the medial  OFC uses early
low-level visual output to match the affordance
associated with it in past experience of the ob-
ject: somatic markers are thereby activated, and
the  appropriate  action is  prepared.  A FS en-
ables an object to be more swiftly categorized
21 For a defence of this view in terms of situated cognition, see Griffiths
& Scarantino (2009). The authors emphasise the environmental scaf-
folding that makes possible affordance detection in emoters.
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at higher perceptual levels. This evidence sug-
gests that affordances are extracted from per-
ception,  but  that  feelings  are  not  themselves
perceived.22 On the contrary, they offer a separ-
ate  kind  of  feedback  to  cognitive  perceptual
processes.
4.4 Respective role of somatic markers 
and formal content
Let  us  turn  now to  one  of  the  most  central
questions that our proposal raises. How does it
explain the respective roles, in expressive inten-
tional content, of somatic markers, on the one
hand, and of the represented formal objects on
the other? Cognitive theorists take emotions to
represent  both  salient  aspects  of  the  agents’
own  bodily  changes  and  an  evaluative  belief
about an external fact, with, possibly, a causal
relation between this fact and the experienced
bodily change (see Gordon 1987; Tye 2008 and
Solomon 2007). For example, when perceiving a
bear  in  the  near  vicinity,  one’s  experience  is
taken to be about a complex of subjective bod-
ily  impressions  (a  pounding  heart,  trembling
legs, etc.) and about the perception of a bear as
being the cause of these changes. Such a con-
strual of the intentional content of feelings only
makes  sense  within  a  propositional  mode  of
thought. Can our expressive mode reflect or ap-
proximate  the  information  contained  in  this
complex causal structure?
Clearly,  FS  does  not  explicitly convey  a
causal relation between situation, somatic mark-
ers and subjective feeling. It carries this causal
relation implicitly, however, as a consequence of
the control architecture that produces feelings.
In an emotional control loop, a perceived afford-
ance causes (rather than being represented as
causing)  its  expressive  evaluation  through  its
specialized sensory feedback. Emotional aware-
ness expresses this functional relation. An ex-
ternal  event  (made  accessible  through  a  per-
ceived affordance, as detailed above) is immedi-
ately  followed  by  subjectively  experienced  so-
matic cues of a given intensity and valence. In
functional terms, this sequence makes sense in
22 When we say that a feeling is felt, “felt” is not intended to mean
“perceived”, but, rather, “entertained”. 
the following way. When an associated forward
model  has  been  selected  (often  automatically,
on the basis  of  an environmental,  somatic,  or
cognitive  affordance),  the  associated  sensory
cues  (the  somatic  markers  in  this  particular
episode) are automatically activated in order to
monitor how this affordance is to be processed
and reacted to. As has been shown elsewhere,
monitoring implicitly carries information about
the command (or the affordance) that is being
monitored (see  Proust 2013). This explanation
is  particularly  detailed  and  convincing  in  the
case of motor representations of action; the feel-
ings of agency that result from the comparators
associated with a given feedforward model ex-
press (among others) whether the emoter is, or
is not, the author of the action currently atten-
ded to (see  Wolpert et  al. 2001 and  Pacherie
2008).  The  present  proposal  generalizes  the
functional  significance  of  feelings  throughout
their diverse types (reviewed in section  2). As
the outcome of sensory comparators, feelings al-
ways carry a structured information set about
the type of affordance they contribute to regu-
lating, about its amount, and about which ac-
tions are appropriate.  This information, in its
own expressive mode, functionally approximates
a causal relation that is, when propositionally
expressed, represented as a relation between an
internal state, an external cause, and a disposi-
tion to act.
In  summary:  Feelings  do  not  gain  their
aboutness  through  a  propositional  thought
where the contrast between object and property
is  semantically  marked;  they  gain  their  func-
tional (rather than propositional) aboutness (f-
aboutness) through the respective roles, in ad-
aptive control, of the selection of an affordance-
dependent  control  model  and  of  the  markers
that allow comparisons of valence and intensity
to be expressed. 
4.5 The attribution problem
This account, however, fails to explain observed
variability in the production of feelings and the
interpretation  of  what  feelings  are  “about”.
There are cases where agents misattribute their
sadness,  their  anger,  or their  happiness  to an
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event that is  either not real,  or that actually
played no role in feeling production. How can
such  a  misattribution  be  explained  on  the
present proposal? Our first attempt to address
this question is based on the subjective ground-
ing of affordances. “Feeling  f” normally means
that  an  affordance  is  sensed,  expressed,  and
subjectively  represented  as  present.  This  does
not mean that the affordance has an objective
counterpart. Thus a thirsty traveller can be de-
lighted or relieved when subjected to a water
mirage. It is no problem for this view, then, if
an event does not have the action potential for
a given affordance it is expressed as having. 
A  trickier  problem  for  the  proposal  is
that a person might feel an f-feeling while she
thinks that she has a g-feeling. Is such a situ-
ation even possible?  To deal  with this  ques-
tion,  we  must  first  clarify  what  “transpar-
ency” means when applied to feelings. A men-
tal state is transparent if, when it is activated,
its intentional content is accessible to the sub-
ject who entertains it, while its vehicle proper-
ties are not. On the view defended above, feel-
ings  are  transparent,  because  their  somatic
markers are felt in connection with a certain
affordance, and because their valence and in-
tensity directly influence the emoter’s motiva-
tion to act in a given way. Such transparency,
however, does not need to entail the subject’s
ability  to  verbally  report  the  content  of  her
feeling. First, as seen above, a feeling can be
felt  by  a  nonhuman  or  by  a  child,  both  of
whom lack the requisite verbal and conceptual
capacities.  Second,  even  an  agent  endowed
with  language  can  express  through  somatic
markers a feeling with a distinctive FS content
while failing to accurately report, in concep-
tual  terms,  what  her  feeling  is  “about”.  We
saw that [aboutness], i.e., reference to an inde-
pendent event or object, is not a concept that
belongs  to  FS.  When  subjects  try  to  infer
[aboutness]  from their  experience,  their  pro-
positional system of representation (PS) is so-
licited.  Because  the  latter  has  an  analytic
rather than an evaluative function, additional
constraints step in. While nonconceptual,  in-
tensive (analog) and value considerations and
norms regulate FS, conceptual, digital, and in-
strumental considerations and norms regulate
PS.23 
Hence, when having to report about her
feelings, a subject needs to translate one mode
of representation into another, with no guaran-
tee  that  this  translation  will  not  enrich  or
modify FS intentional content. First,  she may
no longer have access to the rich diversity of her
FS  experience,  because  her  attention  is  no
longer  directed  toward  the  relevant  contextu-
ally-activated  affordance.  Second,  she  has  to
monitor  other  goals  and  their  corresponding
(social, instrumental, or epistemic) norms. For
example,  she  needs  to  present  her  feelings  to
herself  and to  others  in  a  socially  acceptable
way, and to try to justify them rationally. This
in turn will depend on her existing background
beliefs, on her self-concept, on her capacity for
making self-attributions of this particular kind,
and on her willingness to perform this kind of
introspective report. A number of experiments
and  novels  have  documented  the  wide  gap
between  people’s  feeling  experiences  and  the
verbal report they provide, or the reasons they
offer, for having this or that feeling. These con-
siderations  suggest,  then,  that  the  issue  of
transparency cannot be adjudicated independ-
ently of one’s viewpoint about mental architec-
ture.24 According to the present proposal, an af-
fordance is first subjectively recognized through
the resonance it produces—through its specific
feeling, rather than through a concept-based in-
terpretation. 
Let us now return to our earlier question.
Can a person actually feel an f-like feeling, and
mistake this  f-feeling for a g-feeling? According
23 About  the  nature  and  role  of  nonconceptual  norms,  see  Proust
(2013).
24 An alternative proposal by Carruthers (2011) sees as a condition of
transparency of an affective feeling, rather, that the corresponding
appraisal include the detection of the details of the associated non-
conceptual somatic markers, which makes the recognition of a spe-
cific emotion possible, as well as its subsequent global broadcast—
hence making this information available to the mindreading system.
This analytic view of feelings, however, makes it utterly mysterious
how  a  given  pattern  of  autonomic  measures  is  ever  recognized,
among thousands of similar patterns, as distinctive of an emotion.
On the present view, a feeling is produced within a given forward
model, which automatically activates the comparator for this afford-
ance.  Transparency,  then,  is  effective  only  when  a  given  forward
model is activated, and does not need to transfer to a verbal modal-
ity. This seems to be recognized in part by Peter Carruthers, when
he concludes that “we can have transparent access to the strength of
only our occurrent context-bound affective attitudes” (2011, p. 146).
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to the present account, this situation would pre-
suppose that an f-feeling, as it occurs in the ex-
pressive mode, is  misdescribed in a verbal re-
port as a g-feeling, to finally be genuinely felt to
be g. On this view, a change in representational
form would not only make it possible to reinter-
pret the initial experience in terms of a different
one, but also to feel differently. To see whether
this  case  is  plausible,  it  is  worth  discussing
Schachter and Singer’s (1962) adrenaline experi-
ment.
5 Do beliefs influence affective report?
Schachter and Singer’s famous adrenaline study
aimed  to  collect  evidence  in  favor  of  a  two-
factor theory of emotion, according to which a
changed state of  arousal  leads agents to form
feelings with a given valence that depends only
on  the  epistemic/motivational  context.  Parti-
cipants’  arousal  was  manipulated  by injecting
them,  under  pretext,  with  adrenaline  or  a
placebo. Only a subgroup of the adrenaline par-
ticipants were informed that they had received
a drug that would modify their  arousal  level.
Participants were subsequently invited to stay
in  a  waiting  room  where  a  confederate  was
either pretending to be euphoric or angry. Parti-
cipants’ emotional responses, observed in their
behavior and subsequent self-report, differed in
the various conditions: those unaware of having
been injected with adrenaline, and placed in the
anger condition,  felt  angriest,  followed by the
placebo + anger subjects. The least angry were
the adrenaline informed participants. In the eu-
phoria condition, misinformed adrenaline parti-
cipants were “somewhat” happier, adrenaline in-
formed ones somewhat less happy (in the eu-
phoria condition, the results failed to reach sig-
nificance both for behavior and self-report). 
Were  Schachter  and  Singer  successful  in
making the point that valence of a feeling is a
matter of attribution of the source of an experi-
enced arousal? Several powerful objections have
been raised against this claim. Recall that sub-
jects were asked to what degree they would de-
scribe  themselves  as  happy  or  angry.  A  first
problem is that the questionnaire suggested the
relevant target categories of emotions, which is
disturbingly  close  to  influencing  participants’
responses (see Plutchik & Ax 1967 and Gordon
1987, p. 100). Furthermore, as noted above, ex
post-facto  reflective  labeling  of  one’s  emotion
does not need to express one’s original feelings.
As shown by  Nisbett &  Wilson (1977), self-re-
porting  is  highly  sensitive  to  rationalizations
from context. A second problem, mentioned by
the authors in the discussion, is that the sub-
jects’  verbal  reports  and  emotional  behavior
failed to confirm expectations in the euphoric
condition. A third methodological problem, also
recognized by the authors, is that the student
participants had their own independent reasons
for  feeling  anger  in  passing  this  longish  test,
which  predisposed  them  to  feel  anger.  There
are, however, more theoretical objections. 
On Schachter and Singer’s view, the core
feeling  of  an  emotion  is  an  arousal  change,
which  can  be  artificially  induced  by  drugs.
Valence  is  supposedly  gained  through  contex-
tual beliefs and motives. If this view is accep-
ted, why should we expect that contextually rel-
evant beliefs specify the feeling itself (e.g., the
anger  experience)?  Participants  may  indeed
have been led to believe that they were angry
when they were actually merely aroused. This
does not show, however, that they ever felt any-
thing  else  than  an  arousal  change  (Gordon
1987, pp. 100–101). Schachter and Singer may
have only biased self-attributions and self-report
toward target emotions. The behavioral changes
that were observed and attributed to felt emo-
tion, in addition, can be imputed to social influ-
ence, rather than to intrinsic changes. 
A final worry is that inducing in a parti-
cipant  a  somatic  marker  normally  associated
with a given feeling (e. g., increased heart rate),
and providing the person with a context ration-
alizing this somatic change, does not amount to
an ecological way of producing a feeling. A cog-
nitivist theorist of emotion will insist that the
mere association between a physiological cue of
the feeling f and a context does not amount to
the realization, by a participant, that she feels f
because she is in such and such a context (Gor-
don 1987, pp. 98–99).25 As discussed in section
25 As Gordon observes, “one will not experience fear unless one con-
nects up that cognition with the arousal one feels. To do this re-
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4, the expressive mode has a nonconceptual rep-
resentation of this causal connection. The archi-
tectural  relation  between  feelings  and  afford-
ances  explains  why subjects  experience a sys-
tematic  connection  between  their  feeling  and
what it is “about”, much in the same way that
an  agent  experiences  a  systematic  connection
between an intention to move and the goal that
is aimed at—that is, without needing to repres-
ent conceptually the causal connection between
the two. Nothing prevents the emoter, however,
from forming a secondary conceptual represent-
ation of the emotional experience she has had,
and reappraising the context on the basis of her
background  beliefs.  As  a  consequence  of  this
concept-based  reapparaisal,  the  agent  may
either discount the relevance of her initial feel-
ing (as in the fear-of-snake case), or redescribe
it in the richer terms that she now has available
(as was done, presumably, by the Schachter and
Singer participants). 
Taken together, these objections have led
most theorists to reject Schachter and Singer’s
two-factor theory of emotion, and to look for al-
ternative accounts of  the role  of  inferences in
self-attribution  of  feelings.  It  is  interesting  to
see, however, that a two-factor theory has also
been applied to the case of M-feelings.
6 Are metacognitive feelings sensitive to 
beliefs and inferences?
What are metacognitive (also called  noetic, or
epistemic)  feelings?  Juxtaposing  [being  meta-
cognitive] and [being a feeling] sounds, at least
prima facie, dangerously close to an oxymoron.
When Descartes, Locke, and other 17th-century
philosophers explored the properties of ideas as
being  “clear”,  “distinct”,  “evident”,  and  “cer-
tain” they certainly never took them to be feel-
ings.  These  notions were taken,  rather,  to  be
objective  representational  properties  that  the
mind, unaided by imagination, is able to detect.
David Hume, in contrast, observed in his Treat-
quires, according to him, a second cognition: a recognition or belief
that is one’s being (or taking oneself to be) in a situation of danger
that is causing the arousal one feels. This “cognitivist” objection is
correct when targeting S and S’s theory, who also defend a cognitiv-
ist  view of  feelings.  The  present  view,  however,  proposes  a  non-
doxastic account of feelings, and is thus immune to this objection.”
ise that “the vivacity of  the idea gives  pleas-
ure”, and that “its certainty prevents uneasiness
by fixing one particular idea in the mind, and
keeping it from wavering in the mind of its ob-
jects”  (Hume  1739/40,  2007,  p.  289).  Thus
Hume was glad to accept that epistemic feelings
exist, and that they vary in their vivacity and
in their pleasantness, i.e., in their intensity and
in their valence. Following Hume’s lead, let us
test how our analysis of FS above fares with the
case of noetic feelings. Here, again, is our pro-
posal about the general structure of feelings.
• FS  Affordancea [Placea=here],
[Timea=now/soon],  [Valencea=+/-],  [Intens-
itya=.n(comparatively specified on a scale 0 to
1)], [motivation to acta of degreed according
to action programa].
What is specific to noetic feelings is that the af-
fordances to which the system resonates are “in-
formational” or “metacognitive” rather than en-
vironmental. Hence, the affordance does not re-
late  to  the  external  environment  (the  “here”
slot is often irrelevant, except for perceptual af-
fordances, or place-dependent metacognitive af-
fordances,  such  as  concentrating  in  a  noisy
spot). Although a cognitive action does not, in
general,  consist  in  physical  moves  towards  or
away from an affordance, similar decisions are
motivated or inhibited in the domain of mental
agency:  a  high  retrieval  affordance  motivates
pursuing the memory search, a low one to quit,
etc. Hence our FS analysis also applies to noetic
feelings.
As already emphasized, the affordances ex-
pressed in feelings do not need to be construed
conceptually  in  order  to  be  detected  and  as-
sessed through their  associated somatic  mark-
ers. A conceptual construal, however, is sugges-
ted by the names given, in the literature and in
ordinary  language,  to  M-feelings.  The  term
“feeling of knowing” (in response, for example,
to  the  question:  “what is  the capital  of  Aus-
tralia?”) implicitly presupposes that the emoter
has  access  to  the  concept  of  knowledge.  Ex-
pressing her feeling verbally, indeed, an emoter
might say: “I feel that I know the response to
this question”. In this sentence, she indeed refers
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to  her  disposition  to  retrieve  knowledge  and,
hence,  metarepresents  her  knowledge  disposi-
tion.26 The affordance theory of noetic feelings
suggests a different picture. When trying to re-
member a proper name, a feeling of knowing is
a specific experience of having the ability to de-
tect the target, and of predicting its imminent
recall. It can be associated with a feeling of ten-
sion (Koriat &  Levy-Sadot 1999, p. 486). This
experience is  associated,  then,  with a graded,
intuitive, and affect-like appraisal of a [remem-
bering] affordance. Rhesus monkeys working in
experimental  labs  in  comparative  psychology
show that they can assess their memory afford-
ances (see Beran et al. 2012, Chapter 1).27 What
kind of feedback, then, do monkeys use? A sur-
prising and substantive fact about metacognit-
ive control, first revealed through the pioneering
research of Asher Koriat, is that the comparator
generating  metacognitive  feelings  (such  as  a
feeling of knowing in a memory task, or a feel-
ing of clearly discriminating in a discrimination
task)  has  no  access  to  the  semantic  contents
stored  in  memory  or  made  available  through
perception.  In  Koriat’s  words,  M-feelings  “are
mediated by the implicit application of non-ana-
lytic  heuristics,  relying  on  a  variety  of  cues.”
These cues “pertain to global, structural aspects
of the processing of information”, such as ease
of processing, time devoted to a task, familiar-
ity,  and  accessibility  (Koriat 2000;  Koriat &
Levy-Sadot 1999).28 Therefore, contrary to what
epistemologists have always believed, the most
common type of epistemic appraisal is not dir-
ectly based on the content of the thoughts to be
evaluated, but on the properties of the underly-
ing informational process. 
Neuroscientific  research  confirms Koriat’s
claim.  Implicit,  associative  cues  are  extracted
by the working brain to select, in a cost-efficient
26 Arango-Muñoz (2012) claims that feelings of forgetting and feelings
of knowing are cases of “conceptual experiences”. According to the
present view, following the lead of Koriat and colleagues, M-feelings
can overlap with judgments, and be redescribed in conceptual terms;
they pertain, however, to different representational levels. There are
no “conceptual experiences”, except in the sense of experiencing the
comparative fluency of concepts.
27 As  indicated above,  rhesus  monkeys  are  able,  in  a  perceptual  or
memory task, to opt out of more or less challenging trials as a result
of trial difficulty.
28 As will transpire below, all these cues are, as far as we know, dimen-
sions or effects of fluency, i.e., of ease of processing.
way,  what  there  is  to  learn,  to  retrieve  from
memory, to extract from perception, or what is
worth storing in memory. These are all  to do
with  the  dynamics  of  information  processing:
with its onset, with the comparative amount of
activity in  incompatible  neural responses,  and
with the time needed to converge on a threshold
value.  Indeed,  the  neural  activity  recorded  in
rats’ OFC when attempting to categorize olfact-
ory  stimuli  was  found to  correlate  with  their
predictive behavior (consisting in accepting or
rejecting  a  task  trial);  similar  patterns  have
been found in other species.29 
On the FS model,  somatic markers have
the  function  of  expressing  the  intensity  and
valence of the noetic predictions generated from
feedback at the neural level. As indicated in sec-
tion  2,  psychophysiological  measures  (elec-
tromyography)  provide  evidence  for  the  exist-
ence of facial markers associated with feelings of
fluency and of  disfluency (Winkielman &  Ca-
cioppo 2001).  Increased  activity  in  the  smile
muscle,  the zygomaticus major,  produces feel-
ings with a positive valence. A reduction of flu-
ency is correlated with activity in the corrug-
ator  supercilii  (involved  in  frowning),  which
suggests that this additional effort is felt as un-
pleasant. Intensity of positive or negative con-
fidence, computed implicitly, is expressed by the
corresponding intensity of the noetic feeling. A
different somatic marker of memory appraisal is
the TOT phenomenon. This often occurs when
a search in memory for a specific word fails to
retrieve that word within the usual time inter-
val.  The  informational  ingredients  of  FS  are
conveyed by the intensity of the activity in the
tongue muscle, and by the affective quality of
TOT. Taken together, these predict the likeli-
29 See  Kepecs et al. (2008). An interesting account of the predictive
activity reflected in noetic feelings is that the dynamic activity in the
neurons activated by a given task correlates with the so-called “accu-
mulation of evidence” that is diagnostic of success or failure in that
task. For example, in a perceptual discrimination task, where a tar-
get might be categorized as an X or as a Y, evidence for each altern-
ative  is  accumulated  in  parallel,  until  the  difference  exceeds  a
threshold,  which triggers the perceptual  decision. The information
that will generate a feeling consists, first, in the differential rate of
accumulation of evidence for the two (or more) possible responses,
and second, in stored information about the threshold value, com-
puted from prior trials, which the rate of accumulation should reach
in order to make a cognitive decision likely to be correct. For a dis-
cussion and review of the literature, see  Fleming &  Dolan (2012),
and Proust (2013, pp. 99). 
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hood  of  successful  retrieval.  An  implicit  cue-
based heuristic might thus explain why TOTs
have  the  valid  predictive  value  they  do
(Schwartz et al. 2000). 
6.1 Two-factor theories of M-feelings
In our FS single-factor model, M-feelings have
an intrinsic intensity and an intrinsic  valence.
Two-factor theories make a different claim, in
ways analogous to Schachter and Singer’s the-
ory of aboutness in affects: M-feelings have an
intrinsic arousal level, but their valence depends
on the environment. Jacoby and his colleagues
were  the  first  to  embrace  a  two-factor  view
about  feelings  of  fluency.  They  manipulated
participant’s  exposure  to an  item in order  to
show that enhanced fluency generates an illus-
ory feeling of familiarity. Under conditions of di-
vided attention, reading a list containing both
famous  and  not  famous  names  raised  parti-
cipants’ disposition to wrongly judge as famous
some names presented in a second list, merely
because these names had already been read in
the first  list.  Schachter  and Singer’s  idea was
that fluency is a generic feeling, that needs to
be interpreted on the basis of goals and current
cues, in order to deliver a qualitatively different
specific feeling:
Inherent in the idea that the subjective ex-
perience of familiarity arises from an inter-
pretation of cues is the notion that cues
can be interpreted in a variety of ways. As
noted above, if ease of identifying an item
is obviously being manipulated by the ex-
perimenter,  the  resulting  perceptual  flu-
ency does not give rise to a feeling of fa-
miliarity. Attributions are also affected by
one’s goals. In the context of attempts to
remember, people may be more likely to
interpret  ease  of  generating  an  item  or
perceiving it as familiarity. In the context
of other tasks, the same cues may be inter-
preted  in  other  ways.  (Kelley &  Jacoby
1998, p. 129)
From their viewpoint, the fluency generated by
a given name can, according to the task and the
information made consciously available to a par-
ticipant, be experienced as a feeling of familiar-
ity, or as a feeling of recognition of that name
as “old” (i.e., presented in a former list). They
conclude that a feeling of fluency (generated by
a perceived name) will be experienced as a func-
tion of the alternative ways of interpreting this
feeling, on the basis of the agent’s goals and the
additional cues available.30 
A similar two-factor theory has been de-
fended  in  the  (Whittlesea &  Williams 2000;
Whittlesea &  Williams 2001) model of M-feel-
ings. According to this model, feelings of famili-
arity result from the perception of a nonspecific
discrepancy between the expected and the ob-
served rate of processing of elements in a given
context. Valence and the associated action guid-
ance, on the other hand, are based on a concep-
tual  interpretation  of  what  this  discrepancy
means. For example, you find yourself  waiting
for  the  bus  next  to  people  you expect  to  be
total strangers. Suddenly, you have an unexpec-
tedly high fluency experience when looking at
the  face  of  someone  you  have  already  en-
countered several times—a clerk from the local
grocery  shop.  This  unexpectedly  high  rate  of
discrepancy-reduction  determines  an  intense
feeling of familiarity with a strong motivation to
identify the familiar face (see Whittlesea & Wil-
liams 2001). Had you seen the clerk in the local
grocery store  instead,  you would  have  merely
had  a  feeling  of  recognition  when  seeing  the
clerk. 
To summarize: the core idea in two-factor
accounts  is  that  participants  have  a  primary
feeling of fluency, which they interpret in more
specific terms as a function of their goals and of
the context as they consciously represent it to
be. Thus, on this view, a feeling partly relies on
background knowledge,  and partly on a naïve
theory concerning the relation between feelings
and  mental  activity  (Schwarz &  Clore 2007).
The  naïve  theory  is  as  follows:  feelings  are
about what one is doing, so this feeling must be
about this event of trying to perceive, or this
attempt at retrieving, etc.
30 Jacoby & Whitehouse (1989) similarly argue that a feeling of fluency
can be experienced as familiarity in a memory task, and as confid-
ence in a problem-solving task. 
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As already observed above, a naïve-theory
view is incompatible with monkeys’ and young
children’s  epistemic  evaluations  based  on  flu-
ency. Our FS structure offers an alternative ac-
count: cues (associative heuristics) dictate how
an  affordance  is  detected,  assessed,  and  ex-
ploited in a context, but these cues are not con-
sciously available, and hence do not depend on
a  naïve  theory  of  the  task.  The  Jacoby  and
Whitehouse evidence is compatible with a pro-
cedural view of engagement in a task through
automatic memory processes, and of the feelings
of familiarity they generate. A comparator is al-
ways activated as a function of a subject having
been highly trained in the corresponding first-
level cognitive task. Monkeys and humans feel
that  a  memorial  or  perceptual  affordance  is
present because, if they need to assess whether,
for example, an item was seen earlier, the asso-
ciated comparator produces a feeling of a given
intensity and valence indexing the remembering
affordance.  Thus,  it  is  uncontroversial  that  a
context-dependent  factor  determines  both  the
task to be performed and the reactive metacog-
nitive feeling about this task. 
It  does  not  follow  from  the  context-de-
pendence of a cognitive task, however,  that a
concept-based interpretation will affect the ex-
perienced  feeling  itself,  as  maintained  by  the
two-factor  theorist.  A  cue-based,  non-analytic
heuristic  is  not  inferential  in  the  interpretive,
first-person sense. Regrettably, the word “infer-
ence” has been loosely used in affective and in
metacognitive studies,  to  refer both to “auto-
matic,  non-analytic,  largely  unconscious  and
fast associative processes” (Nussinson & Koriat
2008)  and to conscious reasoning and theory-
building  (Schwarz &  Clore 2007).  These  two
types  of  processes  (respectively  called  “auto-
matic” and “controlled”), are now held by many
authors  to operate  independently.31 While  un-
conscious heuristics rely on implicit associations
between  cues,  inferences  comprise  deductions
from premises to conclusions. Looking back at
Jacoby and Kelley’s  point  above,  we see that
31 For a defence of the distinction see Jacoby & Brooks (1984),
Koriat &  Levy-Sadot (1999),  Recanati (2002) and  Smith &
DeCoster (1999). Koriat & Levy-Sadot (1999) both emphas-
ize  the  distinction  and  use  the  term  “inference”  in  both
cases.
the  authors  are  referring  to  unconscious  cues
being recruited for a task: they are thus refer-
ring to unconscious associative heuristics rather
than to  explicit  concept-based  reasoning.  The
memory  interactions  they  are  exploring,  how-
ever, typically involve both automatic and con-
trolled processes, which is a source of confusion.
As Jacoby and Kelley are eager to show, impli-
cit  associations and explicit  reasoning  lead to
different, incompatible predictions. As a result,
the evidence they present shows how automatic-
ally-generated feelings can be theorized about in
controlled processes.  It  does  not  demonstrate,
however,  that  feelings  depend  upon  theoriza-
tion.  A  theory  of  the  task,  in  contrast  with
automatically generated feelings, offers reasons
to attribute to oneself beliefs and motivations to
act, and, possibly, to reject the relevance of feel-
ings for any particular task. 
Our proposal, then, has several advantages
over  inferential  or theory-based accounts of  f-
aboutness. First, it explains why a feeling of flu-
ency can be experienced, and why it can motiv-
ate agents’ metacognitive responses in species or
individuals  with  no  concept-based  attributive
capacity  (i.e.,  with no  capacity  for  mindread-
ing). Second, our proposal accounts for the dif-
ference between a type of M-feeling (a feeling of
fluency) and the various ways in which it is ex-
perienced across cognitive tasks. Granting that
comparative  ease  of  processing  can  always be
computed, and can be used as a reliable indic-
ator of the likelihood of success across a wide
range of cognitive activities, it is not surprising
that there is  a type of feeling based upon it.
Fluency can be perceptual, memorial (“retrieval
fluency”), or conceptual. It can be used in pre-
dictive  or  retrospective  evaluations.  If  agents
are  asked  to  determine  which  statements  are
likely to be true or false (presumably a question
that  only—but  not  all—humans  can  under-
stand),  felt  perceptual  fluency  will  induce  a
“truth effect”. Agents will evaluate a statement
as more likely to be true than another merely
because it is easier to read.32 If agents are asked
32 There is abundant evidence, however, that M-feelings uncritically guide
epistemic  decision  (i.e.,  are  unopposed  by  concept-based  processes)
mostly when the cognitive task is unimportant, when cognitive resources
are limited (under time pressure or divided attention), and when agents
are in a good mood (Nussinson & Koriat 2008; Schwarz 2004).
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to detect faces of  known people (or of  stimuli
previously  shown),  felt  fluency will  generate  a
sense of  familiarity,  which motivates  agents  to
try to identify the target. If people are asked to
assess the frequency of a given phenomenon, felt
retrieval fluency—that is,  what comes immedi-
ately  to mind—will  be  used  to  judge  what is
more frequent. Felt fluency will also have effects
outside  of  metacognition:  if  agents  are  asked
which particular face, landscape, or picture they
prefer, felt fluency will influence their decision.
Several  affordances,  then,  may  be  associated
with the same globally expressive type of feeling
(constructed as the set of feelings with the same
type of facial markers for ease of processing, for
example). The notion of type of feeling is a tech-
nical term, which is useful to distinguish the di-
verse ways in which fluency is used by the brain.
But a type of feeling is never experienced; only
tokens of the type are. Tokens of feelings of the
same type will differ in the specific affordances
that are detected, and in the tendencies to act
that the feeling motivates. As a consequence, one
cannot  say  that  feelings  of  fluency  “feel  the
same” to an emoter: fluency experienced in an
FOK and in an FOR, for example, apply to dif-
ferent  segments  of  processing,  assess  different
things, and motivate a different action program.
You may first have an FOK after a question is
addressed to you, and then fail to have the asso-
ciated  FOR after  having  come up  with  a  re-
sponse.  These  differences  have  nothing  to  do
with an interpretation: they are constitutive of
what sensitivity to a given affordance amounts
to. Take the case of  feelings of  familiarity. As
summarized  above,  Whittlesea  and  Williams
claim that fluency is the core of the experience,
while familiarity is a conceptual interpretation of
this core feeling. It is more economical, however,
to suppose that familiarity is a different feeling
within the general fluency type, and that it is as-
sociated with a different affordance.
In summary: engaging in a particular cog-
nitive task (e.g., trying to remember, evaluating
retrieval,  assessing  frequency)  does  not  need,
per se, to involve a naïve theory of the task. It
only requires  having a salient affordance,  and
an implicit  heuristic  for  metacognitive  predic-
tions in that task.
6.2 Incidental versus integral feelings
Our proposal also allows us to address in af-
fective terms the issue of incidental versus in-
tegral feelings,  which, in the literature,  is  in-
variably framed in inferential  terms (with all
the  ambiguity  relating  to  this  expression).
Metacognive  feelings  are  called  “incidental”
when they are not based on valid cues for the
cognitive task at hand, and hence, have no pre-
dictive value. They are called “integral” when
they actually carry information about cognitive
outcome. Granting the universal role of fluency
in metacognition, how do people know when a
feeling of  fluency is relevant to a given task,
and which sequence of their cognitive activity
needs to be monitored? A frequent answer, in
the literature, is that agents believe that flu-
ency applies by default to the present domain
of judgment. When, however, agents are led to
believe that a feeling of fluency is purely incid-
ental to the task at hand, they will discount it
in their decision, on the basis of a theory of the
domain of interest (see  Schwarz &  Clore 2007
and Whittlesea & Williams 2000, 2001). Let us
suppose, in what we shall call case (a), that an
agent is explicitly told that a given cue, such
as the ease of reading a given sentence, is irrel-
evant  to  a  given  task—such as  assessing  the
truth value  of  the written statement.  Or,  al-
ternatively, let us suppose—case (b)—that the
agent discovers by himself that there is a con-
nection, but with reverse relevance. Perhaps he
finds  that  badly  written  sentences,  involving
added processing effort—in a given context—
are likely to be true (see  Unkelbach 2007 and
Unkelbach & Greifeneder 2013). A popular ac-
count of these cases is that people will infer re-
spectively,  for  (a):  that  the  feeling  of  fluent
reading they have had  is not about the target
task,  which  entails  that  reading  fluency does
not predict truth, or, for (b): that what pre-
dicts the truth of a written utterance, in this
particular  context,  is  disfluent  reading  (see
Schwarz & Clore 2007, p. 394).
According to this two-factor account, M-
feelings are cognitively penetrable. They can be
suppressed at will, on the basis of a reinterpret-
ation of their being experienced, or can even be
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used to predict falsity instead of truth.33 On the
account proposed here,  in contrast,  M-feelings
are never cognitively penetrable. Why, then, do
subjects stop trusting their feeling of fluency?
Our answer is the following. In the first type of
case, subjects do not allow their feelings of flu-
ency to guide their decision because they have
received verbal instructions to this effect. In the
second type of case, subjects no longer use their
feelings of fluency to form an epistemic decision
in  the  proposed  task,  because  they  have
learned,  over  time,  that  these  feelings  do  not
predict truth in this task. 
In case (a), then, subjects are confronted
with a different task. They are no longer asked
to  express  their  confidence  in  the  truth  of  a
given  sentence (an intuitive,  associative  task);
they are asked to assess the truth of sentences
by taking into account the fact that their feel-
ings of fluency are irrelevant. This new task re-
quires the participants to form appraisals based
on analytic reasoning. Feelings no longer drive
their evaluation and epistemic decision. 
In case (b), where bad writing is associ-
ated with likely truth, no “theory of the task”
needs  to be  formed,  on top of  the first-order
task, which consists in judging whether a writ-
ten statement is true or not. A mere change in
cue validity can produce, over time, a change in
associative  heuristics,  and,  hence,  in  feelings
and in decisions to act. For example, just as our
thirsty  traveller  will  eventually  learn  not  to
trust  an  apparent  “drinking  affordance”,  an
agent will learn, in certain recurrent contexts,
not to trust an apparent “fluency affordance”.
Obviously, cue validity can, in humans, be con-
veyed  verbally;  this  will  considerably  abridge
the revision process of the associated program
of  action.  We then return  to  case  (a):  parti-
cipants will be able to immediately discount an
apparently  valid  cue,  to  turn  to  analytic  ap-
praisals, and to refrain from acting on their flu-
ent feeling (which, however, is still there). Cue
validity,  however,  can  be  learnt  implicitly  as
33 This two-factor account is endorsed by Unkelbach (2007): “the feel-
ing resulting from the discrepancy is non specific, and the discrep-
ancy triggers a search for an explanation […]. The experienced vari-
ations are not attributed to prior exposure, resulting in a feeling of
familiarity, but to some other quality of the statement, namely, that
a statement is true.”
well, which weakens the case for a theory-laden
view of feelings.
These  observations  suggest  that  feeling-
based and analytic appraisal, as hypothesized in
this proposal, “tap separate databases represent-
ing knowledge in different formats.”34 A feeling of
fluency, as a result, can survive being discounted
in decision-making. Another finding points in the
same direction. There is evidence that, even when
an M-feeling has been explicitly discounted (i.e.,
shown to agents to unduly bias their epistemic as-
sessment), the initial feeling remains unaffected,
and  is  able  to  promote  further  epistemic  de-
cisions.  In  Nussinson &  Koriat’s  (2008)  study,
agents exposed to unsolved anagrams and to ana-
grams accompanied by their solution, were asked
to rate the difficulty of these anagrams for naïve
participants with no prior access to the solution.
The participants’ ratings were influenced by the
differential fluency that the anagrams presented
for them: the higher fluency of solved anagrams
biased their attributions of difficulty. After being
informed of the contaminating effect of knowing
the solutions, the participants were invited to cor-
rect their attributions by re-rating the difficulty
of the anagrams, which they did. However, the
participants were subjected to a subsequent test,
where, under time pressure, they had to predict
which of two anagrams would be harder for oth-
ers to solve. These other-attributions of difficulty
presented, again, the same bias for known ana-
grams. Being under pressure allowed participants’
M-feelings to guide decision. The verbal instruc-
tion could shift their controlled responses when
re-rating the anagrams, but did not lead the par-
ticipants to recompute them, as should have been
the case if feelings are cognitively penetrable. 
In  summary:  what  participants  learned
(that solved anagrams only  look easier to pro-
cess)  did  not  influence  what  they  felt  later
(higher fluency is diagnostic of ease of solving).
7 Are all feelings affective?
It is often noticed that a phenomenological con-
trast seems to exist between feelings—that is,
they are not equally emotional. Are not M-feel-
34 A quote from Smith & DeCoster (1999), p. 329, who offer a strong
defence of this view. 
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ings in general as “cold” as the proprioceptive
feeling that my right arm is being extended? Or
can they also be “hot”—that is, involve valence,
i.e., be pleasant or unpleasant? Our proposal of
a common expressive evaluative format suggests
that all the feelings vary in affect in roughly the
same way, because they all  include valence in
their informational structure. Stepper & Strack
(1993),  however,  have  emphasized  that  epi-
stemic feelings are “cold”. Feelings like effort, fa-
miliarity, surprise, or feeling of knowing “have
no fixed valence”, in the sense that they don’t
feel  particularly  good  or  bad.  Linguistic  re-
search on the emotional  lexicon is  invoked as
congruent evidence: for words referring to readi-
ness, success, and a desire to deal with new in-
formation (like “alert” “confused”),  i.e.,  terms
expressing  metacognition,  affects  are  not  “fo-
cal”, which implies that they are not centrally
emotional (Ortony et al. 1987). 
There is abundant evidence, however, that
feelings of fluency increase perceivers’ liking of
the  objects  perceived.  Familiar  items  (other
things being equal) are found to be more pleas-
ant than new ones. An initially neutral stimulus
is felt to be pleasant after repeated exposure.
This  “exposure  effect”,  first  demonstrated  by
Zajonc, has been attributed to increased percep-
tual fluency (Zajonc 1968). This affective effect
of fluency has since been found to apply to any
dimension of a perceptual input. The sense of
beauty in a symmetrical face or in a landscape,
or the pleasure felt in contemplating a picture
seem to  be  inherent  to  the  feeling  of  fluency
generated  in  the  perception.  As  noted  above,
psychophysiological  measures  in  the  facial
muscles provide additional evidence for the af-
fective character of the feeling of fluency (Reber
et al. 2004; Winkielman & Cacioppo 2001; for a
review see Oppenheimer 2008). 
An  interesting,  untested,  speculation  in-
tended to explain the presence of cold and hot
versions  of  feelings  is  that  valence,  although
never  fully  absent  from monitoring,  is  modu-
lated  by  dynamic  aspects  of  the  task  under
evaluation  (Carver &  Scheier 1990;  Carver &
Scheier 2001).  On this  view,  affective  feelings
can appear in physical and cognitive action, and
probably  also  in  somatosensory  experience,
when  certain  dynamic  conditions  for  affective
reactions are present. But what are these condi-
tions? 
Let us first examine an area where these
dynamic  conditions  seem  to  have  a  minimal
role. This is the area of first-order motor control
(including the initiation of an action, the monit-
oring of  its development, and of goal comple-
tion). As with any other form of control, motor
control  involves  specialized  feelings,  in  the
above sense of subjective experiences with a dis-
tinctive  embodied  phenomenal  quality  (see
Pacherie 2008). At first glance, these feelings do
not typically seem to be affective.35 Why is this
so? According to Carver and Scheier, this can
be explained by the dynamics of a monitored
activity  that  generates  feelings.  Affective  feel-
ings are part of a second-order type of feedback,
having,  in  their  terms,  “the  meta-monitoring
function” of “checking on how well the action
loop is doing at reducing the behavioral discrep-
ancy that the action loop is monitoring”. This
meta-loop, then, monitors a particular aspect of
one’s progress in relation to one’s distal goal: it
represents “the rate of discrepancy reduction in
the behavioral (monitoring) system over time”.
This dynamic representation is what a feeling is
equipped to offer: the intensity and quality of a
positive, or a negative, feeling express how far
above, or how far below, the observed  rate of
discrepancy reduction is, with respect to some
reference value. One consequence of this view, if
it turns out to be experimentally validated, is
fascinating and deep: affect in action does not
depend merely  on  the  amount  of  discrepancy
being reduced. An agent may be an inexperi-
enced performer in a task; if the velocity of her
progress to the goal is higher than expected, she
will  feel  more  confident,  and have  retrospect-
ively more positive feelings when reaching her
goal  than  a  competent  performer  whose  pro-
gress to the goal is as steady as predicted. 
There is a second type of affect, according
to  Carver  and  Scheier,  that  the  dynamics  of
prediction can generate. Acceleration is the rate
of change of velocity. Feelings express such ac-
celeration when the rate of discrepancy reduc-
35 Even in this domain, however, an error signal, when conscious, is as-
sociated with an unpleasant feeling.
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tion  increases beyond  expectancy—a  sense  of
exhilaration  then occurs.  Lucky  athletes,  who
break  several  records  within  days,  experience
this. Symmetrical feelings of sinking, or despair,
arise when the rate of discrepancy reduction de-
celerates unexpectedly and falls  below the ex-
pected threshold more quickly than anticipated.
In summary, cold motor feelings are generated
when one is routinely acting on the world, when
things develop as expected, except for small mo-
tor adjustments. Hot action feelings are gener-
ated when action monitoring involves unexpec-
ted dynamics of reduction or increment of likely
success or failure.
How does this theory apply to M-feelings?
A  similar  contrast  may  exist  in  M-feelings.
Carver and Scheier’s model allows us to predict
that  M-feelings  can  have  colder  and  warmer
varieties, depending on the dynamics of the dis-
crepancy reduction that they express. As seen
above, there are two varieties of M-feelings, dis-
tinguished by their function. Some, like FOKs,
have a predictive function. Others, like FORs,
perform  retrospective  evaluation.  Neuroscient-
ists  explain these feelings through the rate of
the accumulation of evidence, measured through
the comparative  activity  of  the neural  assem-
blies involved in cognitive decision. (This rate of
accumulation has to be compared with a stored
standard in order to produce a reliable feeling
of  confidence.)  From  this  widely  accepted
model, it follows that the rate of reduction of
discrepancy  toward  a  confidence  threshold  is
automatically  computed,  and  plausibly  ex-
pressed  through  somatic  markers  that  them-
selves have a varying intensity.
If this reasoning is correct, then although
all M-feelings do not often have a definite “hot”
quality comparable to fear and love, they always
have a valence, according to whether they pre-
dict an agent’s progress towards or away from
her cognitive goal. To find more intense M-feel-
ings, however, one needs to look at the dynam-
ics of meta-monitoring, which is when an agent
expects a given rate of reduction of the discrep-
ancies toward her cognitive goal, and either ob-
serves a  rate that  is  well  above the expected
rate or well below it. In these cases, the sense of
confidence  that  the  positively  surprised  agent
experiences is modulated by an intense, highly
motivating affect of joy and renewed passion for
the associated cognitive activity; while the un-
certainty of the negatively surprised agent is as-
sociated  with  an  intense,  highly  demotivating
affect  of  discouragement,  or  loss  of  interest.
Note how crucial an intense feeling of this kind
can be, especially with regard to future motiva-
tion. It can precipitate in children a passion for
learning; or it can lead them to reject an activ-
ity, or even a whole group of similar activities,
because  of  the  threatening  affect  associated
with  the activity,  often  combined with  a  still
more threatening social affect (the sense of be-
ing an inferior, incompetent performer, or of be-
ing stupid). This kind of meta-monitoring cog-
nitive affect, important as it is in predicting and
fuelling epistemic motivation, is not easily ob-
servable in experimental settings, because it is
elicited in middle or long-term forms of cognit-
ive tasks, such as studying at school in a given
grade, learning algebra, etc. This may in part
explain why Stepper and Strack have failed to
encounter it.
To  summarize:  noetic  feelings,  like  all
feelings, have an evaluative function. They are
the output of a monitoring process, which ex-
presses how likely it is that an agent’s cognit-
ive preferences or goals will be (or have been)
fulfilled in a given task and context. They all
have a valence, but their  affective tonality is
more intensely felt in special  cases that arise
when meta-monitoring makes “intensively new”
affordances  salient.  The rate  or  the  accelera-
tion with which an observed initial discrepancy
differs  from  a  predicted  standard  value  may
either exceed the expected value, thereby pro-
ducing  positive  feelings  of  confidence  or  feel-
ings of knowing, or be insufficient to reach this
value,  producing  negative  feelings  of  uncer-
tainty. The intensity of positive or negative af-
fect in M-feelings thus depends on particularly
unexpected properties of the underlying cognit-
ive activity. 
8 Conclusion
On  the  present  proposal,  “feelings”  are  not
isolated sensory events. They are, rather, the
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ingredients of a nonlinguistic expressive mode
that allows organisms to evaluate and predict
environmental  changes  and  affordances.  This
expressive  mode  is  of  a  relational,  intensive
kind  that  is  not  suitable  for  a  predicative,
concept-based representation of the world. As
a  consequence,  feelings  are  not  themselves
judgments about the world or about one’s own
thoughts.  They are  not  “about”  anything  in
the objective, referring sense of the term. Feel-
ings  are  able  to  approximate  (in  their  own
mode)  the  guidance  offered  by  full-blown
judgments,  and hence can be re-described in
conceptual terms when the latter are available
to the emoter. 
The  importance  of  the  duality  between
an  expressive  and  a  propositional  system of
representation has generally been overlooked.
Even dual-processing theorists rarely appreci-
ate that the two systems involved in cognitive
evaluation and in reasoning have their own in-
dependent,  although  asymmetrical,  role  to
play.  A  purely  automatic,  reactive  type  of
evaluation is possible, and is present in nonhu-
mans  and  young  children.  It  is  prone,  how-
ever, to generating throughout life illusions of
competence and reasoning errors. A conceptu-
ally-controlled type of evaluation, on the other
hand, can partially inhibit the influence of the
expressive system, but it still depends on the
latter to weigh the impact of context on abil-
ity, and to assess the trade-off between ease of
processing and informativeness—that is, relev-
ance—that is crucial in communication and in
problem solving. 
A major practical consequence of the du-
ality between the two target representational
modes  concerns  pedagogy.  Children  cannot
learn  what  they  are  not motivated  to  learn.
Their  motivation  heavily  depends  on  their
subjective experience of what a school context
affords them. Their feelings of confidence, i.e.,
the feedback from the cognitive tasks they en-
gage  in,  have  to  be  sufficiently  positive  and
appropriately calibrated in order for them to
form their  own realistic  and motivating cog-
nitive goals. No amount of analytic reasoning
can replace a positive experience when learn-
ing.
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